Constitutional Amendments 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8: Five Different Questions About Government Power

In a previous article, we examined the five proposed constitutional amendments on Louisiana’s November ballot that deal with taxation. The remaining five move into very different territory: criminal justice, gubernatorial term limits, state retirement liabilities, the use of public funds on private property, and the protection of property rights.

Because the subjects are so different, there is no single policy thread connecting them. But there is a common constitutional one: What powers should government have, what limits should be placed on those powers, and which policy decisions are important enough to belong in the Constitution?

That distinction matters. A proposal may have an appealing objective while still granting government more authority than necessary. Another may restrict government power but also restrict the discretion of voters, judges, or future lawmakers. And sometimes a proposed constitutional restraint may address only one narrow application of a much broader governmental power.

So we will use the same framework we applied to the tax amendments and that we generally apply to all amendments:

• Does it limit the powers of government and government officials?
• Does it decrease the size and scope of government?
• Will it reduce government spending?
• Is it likely to prevent abuse by current or future officeholders?

But these five amendments also require another question: What principle are we putting into the Constitution?

The immediate circumstances surrounding a proposal may change. The constitutional authority or restriction that voters approve can remain in effect for decades. So the question is not merely whether the stated purpose sounds worthwhile today, but whether the power, limitation, or precedent being established is one we will still want government operating under tomorrow. Let’s begin.

Amendment No. 3: Eliminating Post-Conviction Bail for Certain Offenses Against Minors

Do you support an amendment to prohibit a defendant from being released on any post-conviction bail if the defendant is convicted of an aggravated offense against a minor child? (Adds Article I, Section 18(C))

Proposed amendment three is the product of House Bill 51 brought by Representative Debbie Villio (R 7/10) during the 2026 Regular Session, which became Act 271. The bill passed the House 92–0 and the Senate 31–1, with Senator Samuel Jenkins (D 1/10) casting the sole “nay” vote.

This amendment would prohibit post-conviction bail for a defendant convicted of an aggravated offense, as defined in R.S. 15:541, committed against a minor. It covers release after conviction both before sentencing and while a case awaits final judgment. A companion law, Act 285, already places the prohibition in the Code of Criminal Procedure; this proposal would also place it in the Constitution. A rejection of the amendment would leave the existing constitutional bail provisions in place rather than repeal that statute.

This amendment sits in a different place than many “tough on crime” proposals. A legitimate function of criminal justice is to protect people from those who have actually committed violence or coercion. The scarce criminal-justice resources should be concentrated on murderers, rapists, assailants, robbers, and others who pose a genuine threat to victims. A person CONVICTED of an aggravated offense against a MINOR CHILD certainly fits the bill.

Constitutional safeguards still matter, and rights should not be discarded simply because they sometimes benefit guilty people. Those protections ultimately limit what government may do to everyone. The question is whether this defined class of offenses warrants a categorical constitutional prohibition rather than the Constitution’s existing rules governing bail after conviction.

Ask yourself: Should the Constitution categorically prohibit bail after conviction for an aggravated offense against a child, including during the appeal?

Amendment No. 4: Lifetime Term Limits for Governor

Do you support an amendment to prohibit a person who has served more than one and one-half terms as governor from being elected as governor for any future term? (Amends Article IV, Section 3(B))

Proposed amendment four is the product of House Bill 225 brought by Representative Mike Bayham (R 6/10) during the 2026 Regular Session, which became Act 414. This bill was far from a slam-dunk. In the House, it passed over twenty-five “nay” votes, mostly from Democratic members. In the Senate, 10 votes were cast in opposition, all by Democratic Senators.

This amendment would replace Louisiana’s current consecutive-term limitation with a lifetime limit. A person who has served more than one and one-half terms as governor could never again be elected to that office, even after sitting out one or more terms.

The case for the amendment is straightforward: political power can become self-reinforcing. Long tenure gives officeholders time to build networks of influence, cultivate political allies, reward supporters, and become increasingly embedded in the machinery of government. A lifetime limit is therefore an attempt to prevent the governorship from becoming a recurring source of power for the same individual.

That principle fits a broader concern about political office: once people obtain substantial government power, they have strong incentives to preserve and use it. We have to be skeptical that simply electing the “right” person solves the problem, because officials who enter government intending to change it often become part of the system they were supposed to restrain.

But term limits also restrict voters. If the public later wants to return a former governor to office, the Constitution would prohibit that choice regardless of circumstances. So the amendment attempts to limit political power by limiting electoral choice.

That creates the central tension: Is the greater danger allowing one person to repeatedly regain executive power, or preventing voters from choosing someone they believe should serve again?

From a limited-government perspective, term limits may be useful as a restraint on officeholders, but they do not restrain the powers of the office itself. A new governor inherits the same governmental authority as the old one. The deeper safeguard is therefore not merely rotating the people who exercise power, but limiting how much power any governor can exercise in the first place. That is consistent with a broader emphasis on binding government through constitutional limits rather than relying on the character of particular officeholders.

Ask yourself: Should Louisiana protect against the accumulation of political power by permanently limiting who may serve as governor, or is the more important restraint limiting the power of the governorship itself?

Amendment No. 5: Flexibility in Paying Unfunded Retirement Liabilities

Do you support an amendment to authorize a state retirement system to apply any nonrecurring state monies it receives to any of its unfunded accrued liability rather than requiring application to its oldest unfunded accrued liability? (Amends Article VII, Section 10(D)(2)(b)(iii))

Proposed amendment five is the product of House Bill 27 brought by Representative Dixon McMakin (R 7/10) during the 2026 Regular Session, which became Act 606. The bill passed both the House and the Senate unanimously.

This amendment would allow a state retirement system to apply these one-time payments to any of its unfunded accrued liability, rather than applying them first to its oldest outstanding positive amortization bases. Act 606 preserves the requirement that at least 25% of revenue officially designated as nonrecurring go toward state retirement systems’ unfunded liabilities. It also preserves the prohibition on using these payments, directly or indirectly, to fund cost-of-living increases.

Unlike the tax amendments, this proposal is about how government pays debt it has already incurred. Changing which liability receives an extra payment can change when required contributions fall and how much interest is paid. The question is which payment order best uses the money.

From a principled standpoint, flexibility can be useful, but it removes a constraint. The money would still have to be used to reduce retirement debt; the amendment would not authorize spending it on unrelated programs or cancel liabilities that receive no additional payment. The tradeoff is between a fixed constitutional payment order and more discretion over which obligations receive additional payments.

That discretion should be judged by its financial results. The Legislative Auditor’s actuarial note states that a receiving system would need an allocation policy if the Legislature provided no instructions. It does not establish a measurable savings figure for the proposal. Greater flexibility may improve payment decisions, but savings should be demonstrated rather than assumed.

Ask yourself: Should the Constitution dictate which retirement debts receive extra payments first, or should lawmakers and retirement systems have more discretion to choose the payment order?

Amendment No. 7: Using Public Funds on Privately Owned Water Service Lines

Do you support an amendment to allow for the use of public funds by a political subdivision for the purpose of identifying, inventorying, removing or replacing drinking water utility service lines made of or affected by materials as specified or prescribed by the Lead and Copper Rule Improvements of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, promulgated October 30, 2024, or subsequent promulgation, on property owned by utility customers? (Amends Article VII, Section 14)

Proposed amendment seven is the product of Senate Bill 228 brought by Senator Royce Duplessis (D 1/10) during the 2026 Regular Session, which became Act 607. The bill was opposed in both the House and Senate by the more conservative members.

This amendment would allow political subdivisions to use public funds to identify, inventory, remove, or replace drinking-water service lines located on privately owned property when those lines are made of, or affected by, materials covered by the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule Improvements.

The public-policy case is that replacing hazardous service lines protects drinking water, including where part of the line belongs to the customer. The amendment would expressly permit this spending; it would not itself require every local government to replace customer-owned lines or appropriate the money. A separate law, Act 957, addresses municipal entry onto property and notice to owners and residents.

The existing constitutional boundary also needs some precision. Article VII, Section 14 already contains exceptions to its prohibition on donations of public resources. PAR’s amendment guide reports that the Attorney General has advised that the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board can replace customer-owned lead lines under the existing Constitution. That advisory opinion does not have the force of a court ruling. The amendment would provide an express statewide exception.

There is also a delegation issue buried in the language. The amendment does not limit itself only to the EPA rule as it existed on October 30, 2024; it also refers to a “subsequent promulgation.” That means future federal regulatory changes could potentially alter the practical scope of what Louisiana political subdivisions are constitutionally permitted to fund, without another constitutional vote. That is an expansive feature, not a limiting one.

The concern about future federal rules is therefore worth our awareness, but the exception remains tied to drinking-water utility service lines on customers’ property. It does not create a general authority to improve private property whenever officials identify a public purpose. Similar proposals for other private infrastructure would have to stand on their own legal footing.

Ask yourself: When a private property condition creates a broader public concern, should government be allowed to spend public money correcting it — and if so, how tightly should that authority be limited?

Amendment No. 8: Expropriation by Foreign Adversaries

Do you support an amendment to prohibit expropriation of property by a foreign adversary or an agent of a foreign adversary? (Amends Article I, Section 4(B)(4))

Proposed amendment eight is the product of House Bill 192 brought by Representative Chuck Owen (R 9/10) during the 2026 Regular Session, which became Act 277. The bill passed both the House and the Senate unanimously.

This amendment would prohibit a private entity that is a foreign adversary, or an agent of a foreign adversary, from using Louisiana’s expropriation power to take or damage property.

The existing constitutional language already allows certain private entities authorized by law to expropriate property for a public and necessary purpose, subject to just compensation and judicial review. The amendment would carve out one category of private entity that could never exercise that power.

From a principled standpoint, the amendment moves toward limiting who may exercise coercive government authority over private property. That is important. Expropriation is not an ordinary private transaction; it is the exercise of a power backed by government force. The amendment says that certain foreign-controlled private entities should not be permitted to exercise that power at all.

But it also raises a broader property-rights question. If it is objectionable for a foreign adversary to use delegated government power to take private property, why is the same coercive power acceptable when exercised by other private entities? That is a question many critics of carbon-capture expropriation would likely ask as well. The amendment narrows the class of entities that may expropriate, but it leaves the underlying delegation of the power to expropriate intact.

The Legislature has already supplied the definitions through Representative Owen’s House Bill 180, now Act 786. Effective August 1, 2026, the companion law added R.S. 9:2717.1.1. It defines the terms for private-entity expropriation; Amendment Eight would put the prohibition itself in the Constitution. Voters are therefore considering a constitutional restriction with statutory definitions already on the books.

For “foreign adversary,” Act 786 requires identification under the federal regulation it cites, 15 CFR 7.4(a), and in the database maintained by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. An “agent” is an entity whose management or policies a foreign adversary can direct through securities ownership, contracts, or other means. At least 50% of voting interests or profits creates a presumption of control. It is not the only way to establish control.

The practical distinction is control, not simply some foreign ownership. A company could fall within the definition through contractual control without majority ownership. The prohibition would be constitutional, while lawmakers could revise the statutory definitions through ordinary legislation. The reach of that distinction deserves attention alongside the broader question of which private entities should have expropriation power.

Ask yourself: Should the concern be limited to foreign adversaries exercising expropriation power, or should Louisiana reconsider more broadly when any private entity should be allowed to use government power to take another person’s property?

Taken together, these five amendments are less about one common policy area than about the boundaries of government power itself. They ask voters to decide when judges should lose discretion, when voters should lose electoral choice, when administrators should gain financial flexibility, when public money may be spent on private property, and when private entities should be barred from exercising delegated government power.

The ballot language tells voters what each amendment does. The harder question is whether the principle behind each one belongs in the Constitution.

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