Eddie Lau Lawsuit Claims Election Deception is Protected Speech

The election is over. Yet just one day after voters returned Fifteenth Judicial District Attorney Don Landry to office for another six years, political consultant Chun Ping “Eddie” Lau filed a federal civil rights lawsuit alleging violation of his rights and challenging the constitutionality of Louisiana’s election law. The timing is interesting, but so are the political relationships and legal arguments contained within the 48-page complaint.

Citizens for a New Louisiana has been following this matter since February 2025, when questionable political text messages surfaced during the special election for Louisiana Senate District 23. The messages appeared to originate from Democratic organizations and referenced Republican candidate Brach Myers. Broussard Councilman Jesse Regan was running for the same office. Numerous endorsements raised questions about whether voters were being deliberately misled into believing Myers enjoyed support from leftist organizations that did not actually endorse him.

The investigation eventually led to the March 13, 2025, arrest of Lau, a political consultant working for the Regan campaign. Search warrants were executed, electronic devices were seized, and the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Office announced the arrest. Yet more than nineteen months later, no formal criminal prosecution has been instituted. Our June article, Fish or Cut Bait: The Procedural Limbo Surrounding Eddie Lau, questioned why prosecutors had failed to make a decision. Now Lau is asking a federal court to intervene.

The Don Landry Problem

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the filing is its timing. On November 3, 2026, Don Landry defeated challenger Kristian Earles to secure another six-year term as District Attorney. The following day, Lau’s attorneys filed suit against District Attorney Don Landry, Louisiana Attorney General Liz Murrill, Lafayette Parish Sheriff Mark Garber, and several investigators.

The complaint provides an additional revelation. According to Lau, Don Landry publicly stated that he intended to recuse himself from any prosecution arising from his prior professional relationship with Lau. Yet we can’t find any record of Landry recusing himself from the case. The complaint also suggests that the Attorney General’s Office would handle any eventual prosecution. That leaves an important procedural question unanswered.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 681 permits a district attorney to recuse himself when grounds for recusal exist. It reads:

“A district attorney may recuse himself, whether a motion for his recusation has been filed or not, in any case in which a ground for recusation exists.  A motion to recuse the district attorney shall be in writing and shall set forth the grounds therefor.  The motion shall be filed in accordance with Article 521, and shall be tried in a contradictory hearing. If a ground for recusation is established the judge shall recuse the district attorney.”

So, in essence, the lack of recusal is nothing more than Landry’s failure to step aside and allow an independent prosecutor to take the reins. That process is further described in Article 682, which provides the mechanism for appointing a substitute prosecutor following recusal. Until that process occurs, a public announcement of an intention to recuse does not, by itself, transfer prosecutorial authority to the Attorney General.

For nineteen months, Lau’s matter has remained unresolved. If Landry believed his relationship with Lau justified stepping aside, why has that process apparently not been completed? Why has a formal recusal not occurred? Why has a substitute prosecutor not been appointed? And who has been responsible for making these prosecutorial decisions, or the lack thereof? These questions are especially relevant because Lau’s own complaint identifies the prolonged uncertainty as a source of substantial personal and financial harm.

Whose Speech Is Being Chilled?

Lau’s complaint repeatedly invokes the First Amendment. Lau advances a retaliation claim, arguing that his arrest, the seizure of his equipment, and the damage to his livelihood would discourage a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected political activity. Something commonly referred to as a “chilling effect.”

But there is another chilling effect that deserves consideration. What about the ordinary citizen contemplating a campaign for public office? We often hear about the lack of political candidates, and when asked why they won’t run for office, many otherwise qualified people cite a fear of ‘being dragged through the mud.’

When political campaigns become exercises in manufacturing statements, false endorsements, impersonation, or deliberate misinforming voters, the consequences extend beyond the immediate election. Citizens may reasonably conclude that seeking public office is not worth the risk of personal destruction. The First Amendment protects citizens against governmental retaliation, but the public should be equally concerned about the practical consequences of organized political deception.

The Legislature Has Already Spoken

Louisiana’s Legislature has recognized the dangers associated with deceptive political communications. Revised Statute 18:1463(A) expressly declares that the state has a compelling interest in protecting fair and ethical elections. It specifically addresses falsely attributed endorsements, misleading political affiliations, and the public’s interest in knowing who is responsible for political communications. These are the stated purposes behind the law Lau now seeks to invalidate in federal court.

Lau’s attorneys focus heavily on the wording of R.S. 18:1463(C)(1). The provision prohibits distribution of material containing statements about a candidate that a person “knows or should be reasonably expected to know” are false. Those phrases describe two different standards. The first requires knowledge of falsity; the second potentially reaches statements made negligently. Lau’s complaint emphasizes the language of negligence, arguing that criminalizing negligent political falsehoods violates the First Amendment.

Impersonation or Identity Theft?

There is also a significant difference between expressing an unfavorable political opinion and knowingly manufacturing false information. The messages underlying this investigation suggested that Democratic organizations were supporting a Republican candidate, Myers. The purported source was central to the message. If the objective was to persuade Republican voters to reject Myers because Democrats supposedly supported him, the deception concerned the speaker’s identity rather than merely an inaccurate opinion about the candidate.

In that respect, the alleged conduct more closely resembles impersonation or fraudulent attribution than ordinary political criticism. Louisiana’s election law separately addresses certain forms of knowingly misrepresenting that a person or organization speaks on behalf of a candidate, committee, or political party. Louisiana R.S. 18:1463(C)(4) provides:

“(a) No person shall misrepresent himself or any committee or organization under his control as speaking, writing, or otherwise acting for or on behalf of any candidate, political committee, or political party, or any employee or agent thereof.

(b) No person shall willfully and knowingly participate in or conspire to participate in a plan, scheme, or design to misrepresent himself or any committee or organization under his control or under the control of any other participant in the plan, scheme, or design as speaking, writing, or otherwise acting for or on behalf of any candidate, political committee, or political party, or any employee or agent thereof.”

Even if the negligence language in Subsection (C)(1) is determined to be unconstitutional by the federal court, it does not necessarily follow that the state is powerless to prohibit every form of deliberate political impersonation.

The Press, Politics, and the First Amendment

Another notable aspect of the lawsuit is the identity of one of Lau’s attorneys. Scott L. Sternberg, managing partner of Sternberg, Naccari & White, serves as general counsel to the Louisiana Press Association. His firm’s biography also identifies his work advising major news organizations, including The Advocate and The Times-Picayune. It describes his extensive involvement in drafting, amending, and advocating legislation before the Louisiana Legislature. Additionally, both Sternberg and Lau have previously served as lobbyists in Louisiana.

Many citizens already question whether the legacy media is merely investigating political misconduct or actively participating in it. An investigative journalist is expected to uncover and test facts. A political consultant is hired to advance a candidate’s interests. Sternberg’s involvement presents an interesting intersection of interests. The same constitutional principles that protect journalists investigating powerful political figures are now being invoked to defend a political consultant accused of using deceptive tactics to influence an election.

A Noncitizen in American Politics

The complaint also discloses something not previously central to our coverage. It identifies Lau as a lawful permanent resident who has lived in the United States for nineteen years and intends to pursue naturalization. So, according to his own pleading, Lau is not a United States citizen.

Lau’s consulting activities are listed in his filing and reportedly included work for numerous well-known Louisiana candidates and incumbents. Consequently, Lau’s acknowledged status as a lawful permanent resident does not, standing alone, make his political consulting activities unlawful. Still, one has to wonder about these foreign connections. American elections determine who will exercise governmental authority over American citizens. The extent to which noncitizens should participate in influencing those outcomes is a legitimate policy question.

There is another unusual claim. Lau contends that the unresolved investigation has interfered with his ability to pursue naturalization. An arrest or pending investigation may complicate immigration proceedings, but it does not necessarily prohibit filing an application. Whether Lau faces an actual legal impediment or has chosen to defer naturalization is not mentioned. But it is also important to remember that Lau HAS NOT yet been charged with a crime.

Political Connections and Alleged Retaliation

The complaint goes further in identifying political relationships. Lau’s filing alleges that Sheriff Mark Garber had expressed an intention to run for the United States Senate, potentially placing him in competition with Blake Miguez, whose campaign Lau was assisting before his arrest. His attorneys use that alleged political rivalry to suggest that Garber had a personal interest in disrupting Lau’s consulting activities.

The Unanswered Question

The November 4 lawsuit presents two distinct questions that should not be confused.

1. Whether Louisiana’s election statute impermissibly infringes upon protected political expression.
2. Whether law enforcement and prosecutors acted within the law when investigating Lau and deciding what to do with the evidence collected.

Lau is entitled to the same constitutional protections as anyone else. But those protections do not automatically establish that the political communications attributed to him were lawful, that every form of deliberate electoral deception is protected, or that Louisiana has no legitimate interest in preventing voters from being misled about the source of fake political endorsements.

The public deserves an explanation for why a matter involving an arrest, extensive property seizures, and multiple state agencies has remained unresolved for nineteen months. Don Landry’s stated intention to recuse himself only deepens that question. After securing another six-year term, it is time to establish whether he will actually step aside and allow the Attorney General to take over. Or will it just be allowed to die on the vine, like the Josh Guillory prosecution, which Landry refused to pursue until it was too late? A St. Martin Grand Jury later indicted Guillory, but that prosecution is now being challenged as being brought in the wrong venue.

Ultimately, the larger issue extends beyond Eddie Lau. If the law cannot distinguish between political criticism and deliberate impersonation, ordinary citizens may find themselves increasingly reluctant to participate in elections dominated by professional political operatives. Protecting political speech and protecting the integrity of elections should not be treated as mutually exclusive objectives. Both are essential to a functioning constitutional republic.

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