Amendment 3: A Deeper Dive into Permanent Teacher Pay Raises

After publishing our initial overview of the proposed constitutional amendments, I received several questions about Amendment 3—particularly about how it actually works. This is one of the most complex and consequential items on the ballot. And while the summary article outlined the basics, a closer look reveals a much bigger issue than teacher pay raises alone.

Now that I have been encouraged to dig deeper, especially into some of the questions raised, here is a more complete analysis.

The Pitch: Permanent Raises Funded by “Savings”

At first glance, Amendment 3 sounds straightforward. The state will pay down the retirement system debt (Unfunded Accrued Liabilities or the UAL), which is a positive step. Then, we’ll use the resulting savings to provide permanent pay raises for teachers and staff. Specifically, $2,250 for certificated personnel and $1,125 for non-certificated personnel.

Supporters argue this is a responsible way to increase teacher pay without raising taxes. To be fair, there is some good logic behind that argument. If paying down long-term debt reduces future obligations, using those savings for compensation could make sense, but only if the numbers hold. And that’s before we even consider the major constitutional policy question, which we’ll get to shortly.

What the Amendment Actually Does

Amendment 3 goes far beyond authorizing a pay raise. It liquidates nearly $2 billion in constitutionally protected education trust funds. Then it redirects those funds to pay down the Teachers’ Retirement System’s unfunded liability. So far, that action sacrifices short-term interest income while yielding greater estimated long-term savings, which is good! However, it then requires specific dollars to be dedicated to permanent pay increases.

Here’s the key distinction. The amendment does not condition the raises on the success of the savings. It guarantees the raises regardless. If the savings fall short — and even state analysts acknowledge this may occur — the state would still be required to fund the shortfall through increased allocations in the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP).

The Cost Question

One of the most common questions we received was about the various funds and their numbers. Did we look at the size of the trust funds, the projected savings from UAL reduction, and the actuarial estimates? While those are important, the amendment itself never clearly states the total annual cost of the raises.

A reasonable estimate, based on available workforce data, puts the annual cost at approximately $180–$200 million, including benefits and retirement costs. Exact costs will vary depending on staffing levels and benefit assumptions, but even conservative estimates place the obligation in this range. And yet, the amendment locks in the obligation to spend that $200 million without first definitively establishing that the funding mechanism will cover it in the long term.

What the Fiscal Note Actually Says

Some have pointed to the swirling dollars and data surrounding these funds as evidence that this plan is sound. But the fiscal note on the bill itself is more nuanced. It acknowledges that the state will lose approximately $68 million in recurring education funding. Then it lists the increased state spending through the MFP. Most importantly, it says that the actual financial impact cannot be fully quantified.

However, the fiscal tables clearly indicate an expectation that expenditures INCREASE while revenues DECREASE. The fiscal note does not specify the amounts of these increases and decreases — it only says they will occur in some fashion. Plainly, the state expects to spend more while taking in less, but state analysts were unable to determine the exact difference.

But the MFP is already in the Constitution!

And now we get to the Constitutional policy part of this amendment. Another question I received was: Isn’t the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) already in the constitution, and already does all this? Not in the way this amendment does. The Constitution does require an MFP and establishes the process by which it’s created. First, the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) develops a funding formula. Then the Legislature approves or rejects it.

However, the Constitution does not currently mandate that the MFP include specific salary levels, lock in fixed spending dollar amounts, or guarantee permanent funding outcomes. The MFP is designed to be flexible—to allow policymakers to make adjustments as conditions change from year to year. Amendment 3 breaks from that model. Instead of just guaranteeing that education is funded, the Constitution will now mandate a specific outcome, down to an exact dollar amount. Said another way, this amendment seeks to enshrine a specific budget line item directly in the Constitution.

The Structural Issue No One Is Talking About

This is where the conversation needs to shift. Amendment 3 is not just a fiscal policy; it’s a constitutional design decision. What would normally be a legislative choice, a budget decision, and an annual policy debate is turned into a permanent constitutional requirement. This is essentially pre-legislating future budgets inside the Constitution, which is about as far from traditional constitutional design as you can get.

Louisiana lawmakers frequently point out that they are financially constrained by decisions made by legislatures of years—or decades—ago. They argue that prior legislatures locked in spending, limited flexibility, and left future policymakers with fewer options. And yet, Amendment 3 does exactly that again! It binds future legislatures to a specific spending obligation—regardless of future economic conditions, priorities, or fiscal realities.

Even PAR — one of the state’s leading nonpartisan policy groups — warns that Louisiana’s Constitution is already overloaded with policy details that belong in statute. Amendment 3 doesn’t break from that pattern.

The Question Voters Should Ask

This ultimately comes down to broader questions. Should we be putting budget line items (such as specific pay raises) in the Constitution itself? Should we collapse those three dedicated funds and use the proceeds to pay down retirement debt? Absolutely. Should we use the Constitution to permanently lock in new spending based on projected savings? That’s a tougher question.

The debate on this one amendment highlights a real tension in policy thinking. If you prioritize fiscal reform above all else, Amendment 3 makes sense. But if you prioritize keeping the Constitution limited to broad principles, it raises serious concerns. This distinction is what voters are being asked to decide on May 16th.

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